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ABSTRACT
We present Fission, a new permissionless blockchain that
achieves scalability in both terms of system throughput and
transaction confirmation time, while at the same time, retain-
ing blockchain’s core values of equality and decentralization.
Fission overcomes the system throughput bottleneck by
employing a novel Eager-Lazy pipeling model that achieves
very high system throughputs via block pipelining, an adap-
tive partitioning mechanism that auto-scales to transaction
volumes, and a provably secure energy-efficient consensus
protocol to ensure security and robustness.
Fission applies a hybrid network which consists of a re-
lay network, and a peer-to-peer network. The goal of the
relay network is to minimize the transaction confirmation
time by minimizing the information propagation latency. To
optimize the performance on the relay network in the pres-
ence of churn, dynamic network topologies, and network
heterogeneity, we propose an ultra-fast game-theoretic relay
selection algorithm that achieves near-optimal performance
in a fully distributed manner. Fission’s peer-to-peer network
complements the relay network and provides a very high
data availability via enabling users to contribute their storage
and bandwidth for information dissemination (with incen-
tive). We propose a distributed online data retrieval strategy
that optimally offloads the relay network without degrading
the system performance.
By re-innovating all the core elements of the blockchain
technology - computation, networking, and storage - in a
holistic manner, Fission aims to achieve the best balance
among scalability, security and decentralization.
1 INTRODUCTION
Due to the phenomenal success of cryptocurrencies [30, 40]
in the last few years, blockchain technology has gained mas-
sive interests, and recently emergedwith a promise to stream-
line interactions in a wide range of settings. A blockchain,
also called a distributed ledger, is a decentralized and in-
corruptible ledger used to record transactions across many
nodes1 which do not need to fully trust each other. By ap-
plying certain consensus mechanisms, all the nodes in a
blockchain network agree on an ordered set of blocks, each of
which could contain multiple transactions. It should be noted
that we only discuss permissionless or public blockchains
in this paper, where anyone can join and participate in the
process of transaction verification and block proposing.
The key feature of blockchains is decentralization. That is,
instead of relying on central trusted authorities or infrastruc-
tures, blockchains are built on top of a global peer-to-peer
(P2P) network, where messages (e.g., transactions, blocks) are
disseminated to the whole network in a gossip-like manner.
Moreover, everyone can verify all the transactions and pro-
pose new blocks which are supposed to be appended to the
blockchain via consensus mechanisms. Note that these trans-
actions are not just financial transactions (e.g., cryptocur-
rencies, tokens), but virtually everything of value. By apply-
ing new applications, like smart contracts [18], blockchains
have been leveraged to many sectors, e.g., financial services,
Internet-of-Things, insurance, shifting the landscapes of the
industries that worth trillions of dollars.
Despite the fact that the blockchain technology brings
significant opportunities and disruptive potential in many
industries, scalability has been a key issue severely that lim-
its the adoptions of the blockchain technology, causing poor
user experience, congested network, and skyrocketing trans-
action fees. The scalability of blockchains is fundamentally
hindered by the challenges of distributed system design (e.g.,
consensus protocols), and limitations of the underlying P2P
networks. More specifically, the former results from the core
problem of all blockchains, i.e., double-spending. It is difficult
to prevent double-spending by achieving consensus on an or-
dered list of transactions in a public setting where anyone, in-
cluding malicious users, can participate, anytime, anywhere.
The latter is due to the fact that P2P network protocols (e.g.,
Kademlia DHT [1, 28]) that most existing blockchains em-
ploy are not designed for blockchains, where messages (i.e.,
transactions and blocks) need to be disseminated constantly
in a many-to-many manner. Therefore, there are two impor-
tant challenges that a scalable blockchain should address: 1)
1We use the terms node, peer, and user interchangeably.
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high throughput (measured by the transaction rate, i.e., TPS)
and 2) fast confirmation times2.
To address the first challenge, a considerable amount of
Proof-of-Work (PoW) based consensus protocols [14, 26, 37,
38] and Proof-of-Stake (PoS) based consensus protocols [3, 7,
10, 22] have been proposed to increase the system throughput
without compromising the security guarantees and decentral-
ization. However, all of the above new PoS-based consensus
protocols can only achieve sub-optimal performance in terms
of system throughput and confirmation times due to 1) the
constrained resources (computation, bandwidth, memory,
etc.) of nodes that are selected for transaction verification
and block proposing, and 2) the limitations of underlying
P2P networks which results in high information propagation
latency due to dynamic network topologies and huge blocks
with a large number of transactions. To further improve the
system throughput, sharding technology [25, 39, 41] has been
proposed to split up the task of consensus among multiple,
smaller concurrently operating sets of nodes, thus reduc-
ing per-node processing and storage requirements. How-
ever, creating a secure sharding solution that is capable of
making cross-shard (or inter-shard) transactions (especially
atomic synchronous transactions) is non-trivial, and exist-
ing sharding-based consensus protocols either make secu-
rity/performance trade-offs or rely on strong assumptions
(e.g., trusted authorities) that defeats decentralization.
To address the second challenge, some centralized relay
networks has been applied (FIBRE3 and Falcon4 for Bitcoin) or
proposed [24] to reduce the information (e.g., blocks) prop-
agation latency. However, all the existing relay networks
(either centralized or distributed) for blockchains have paid
little attention to the system dynamics (which can be cat-
egorized into churn, i.e., users leave and join the system),
and network heterogeneity (i.e., relayers have different and
time-varying bandwidth capacities). Without addressing the
system dynamics and network heterogeneity, the perfor-
mance of relay networks may not only be far from optimal,
but it may also be detrimental in practice.
In this paper, we present Fission, which achieves both high
system throughput and fast confirmation times without com-
promising security and decentralization. Fission improves
upon the scalability limitations in several ways. First, we
propose an Eager-Lazy pipeling model that separates every
atomic transaction into two successive and independent sub-
transactions, which can be processed separately without any
communication cost (which significantly deteriorates scala-
bility with sharding based solutions). This enables optimal
parallelization while maintaining consistency. Second, we
2A transaction is confirmed if it is included in a confirmed block.
3http://bitcoinfibre.org/
4https://www.falcon-net.org/
propose an adaptive partitioning mechanism that groups
sub-transactions into different partitions according to the
latest transaction volumes. As a result, an optimal tade-off
between system throughput and confirmation times can be
achieved. Last but not least, we employ a PoS-based con-
sensus protocol to reach consensus on transactions in every
partition with high security guarantees while maintaining
decentralization. We investigate and prove the effect of sys-
tem activity and honest threshold to the security guarantees,
and then propose an online algorithm that enables consensus
to be reached in a distributed and non-interactive manner.
Fission employs a hybrid network tominimize the informa-
tion propagation latency, as a result, both system throughput
and confirmation times can be significantly improved. The
proposed hybrid network consists of a relay network and a
P2P network. To achieve a stable and near-optimal the infor-
mation propagation latency in the presence of unpredictable
system dynamics and network heterogeneity, we propose
an ultra-fast probabilistic relayer selection algorithm which
converges in O(loglogN r) steps, where N r is total number
of nodes in the relay network. The P2P network of Fission
complements the relay network such that blocks and even
the whole blockchain data can be retrieved from nodes, thus
dramatically increases the data availability. We propose an
online data retrieval strategy that enables any node to re-
trieve information from both the relay network and the P2P
network in an efficient and cost-effective manner.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section 2 pro-
vides an overview of Fission fundamentals, including the
data structures and cryptographic technologies used in Fis-
sion blockchain. We then provide the details of the Eager-
Lazy transactionmodel, the adaptive partitioningmechanism
and the consensus protocol in Section 5. In Section 6, we
investigate the problem of minimizing the information prop-
agation, and describe our relay selection algorithm, followed
by the convergence analysis of the distributed algorithm.
Section 7 details the P2P storage layer, the proposed data
retrieval strategy and its efficiency. Section 9 will conclude
the paper.
2 OVERVIEW OF FISSION
Fission consists of three layers, each of which is designed
to fulfill the requirements of three core components of a
blockchain: 1) the computation layer than enables all the
nodes agree on the common view of a blockchain in pres-
ence of Byzantine failures, 2) the network layer that delivers
transactions and blocks to all the nodes to create consensus,
and 3) the storage layer that form an append-only, temper-
proof distributed ledger with cryptographic data structures.
The native currency in Fission, denoted by FIT, is an utility
token that enables users to participate in consensus and pay
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for the transaction processing, smart contract execution, etc..
Without loss of generality, any reference to amount, value,
balance or payment in Fission should be counted in FIT.
2.1 Definitions
2.1.1 Account. Fission is a account-based blockchain. Each
account has a pair of private and public keys. The private
key, denoted by sk , is generated by secp256k1 curve [36]
and it should be always kept secret. The public key, denoted
by pk , is derived from the private key with Elliptic Curve
Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [23]. The public key
is also referred to as the address of an account, and it can be
safely shared in public as it is almost impossible to derive the
private key from a public key. One user may control many
accounts, but only one public key may exist per account.
2.1.2 Transaction. A transaction is essentially a digitally
signed message, where the data includes: 1) the transaction
type, 2) a token transfer from one account (i.e., the sender) to
another (i.e., the receiver), 3) a scalar value to be transfered
from the sender, 4) a nonce that indicates the number of
transactions sent by the sender, 5) a hash of the additional
data that can be stored in the P2P storage layer, and 6) a
signature of the transaction that used to determine the sender
of the transactions. The unique identifier of a transaction is
the SHA3-256 hash of the transaction.
2.1.3 Block. A block in Fission consists of 1) a body that con-
tains a list of ordered transactions to be confirmed, and 2) a
header that contains Merkle root arrays of these transactions,
account table, and transaction logs, as well as the metadata
(e.g., signatures, votes) needed for the consensus. The ac-
count table is a mapping between accounts and their states
which contains the information like balances, nonces, etc..,
and the transaction logs contains the post-transaction states
and logs created through execution of these transactions.
2.1.4 Chain. Fission can be viewed as a transaction-based
state machine where every block contains a set of states that
can include such information as account balances, transac-
tion logs, etc.. To apply the novel Eager-Lazy pipeling model
(see Section 3) that significantly improve the scalability, Fis-
sion introduces two types of blocks that are appended to the
blockchain in an alternating manner: 1) the interim block
that confirms the eager sub-transactions, and 2) the main
block that confirms the corresponding lazy sub-transactions.
2.1.5 Merkle root array. Every block has a set of Merkle root
arrays (e.g., txRoot[]), each of which is an array of Merkle
roots of all the shards. A Merkle tree is a binary tree in which
every leaf node is labeled with the hash of a data block and
every non-leaf node is labeled with the cryptographic hash
of the labels of its child nodes.
2.1.6 Shard. A shard is a subset of transactions and states
that are grouped by applyingmodulo function on their public
keys. Let pki denote the public key of node vi , then all the
transactions sent byvi and the states ofvi will be assigned to
the shard with index j ≡ pki mod Nshard, whereNshard is the
total number of shards. The value of Nshard is contained in
every block header, and it is increased based on re-sharding
algorithm which is detailed in Section 4.2.
2.1.7 Partition. A partition consists of one or more shards.
Fission’s consensus is operating at the partition level such
that a small group of nodes will be randomly selected (with
probability proportional to their stakes) for each partition
to reach a consensus on all the transactions in shards of
the partition. Similarly, as detailed in Section 4, shards are
assigned to partitions by applying modulo function on their
shard indexes.
2.2 The Computation Layer
The goal of the computation layer is to verify transactions,
reach consensus on new blocks, and append blocks to the
blockchain. To improve the system throughput, sharding, a
commonly used scalability scheme in databases decades ago,
has been applied to parallelize transaction processing via
splitting the overheads of operation among multiple, smaller
groups of nodes (i.e., shards). However, all existing sharding-
based solutions are far from optimal, as they impose a huge
burden for the network due to cross-shard communication
and synchronization. This significantly deteriorates both the
system throughput and transaction confirmation times.
To overcome the limitations of scalability, we propose a
novel Eager-Lazy pipeling model, an adaptive partitioning
mechanism and a PoS-based consensus protocol in Fission’s
computation layer, which significantly improve the scalabil-
ity while maintaining security and decentralization.
2.2.1 Eager-Lazy pipeling model. We propose a Eager-Lazy
pipeling model (see Section 3) that maximizes the paralleliza-
tion by block pipeling without cross-shard communication.
The basic idea is to separate each atomic transaction into two
types of independent sub-transactions that can be processed
sequentially while ensures consistency of the transaction.
As a result, Fission’s blockchain use two types of blocks
that are appended to Fission’s blockchain in an alternating
manner such that each block contains a set of confirmed
sub-transactions with the same type.
2.2.2 Adaptive partitioning mechanism. To the best of our
knowledge, none of existing sharding-based solutions adapts
the time-varying transactions volumes. More specifically,
all the transactions will be distributed to a fixed number of
shards. If the transaction volume decreases (during non-peak
hours), shards will be underutilized in terms of computation,
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but both the intra-shard and the inter-shard communication
cost remain the same. To this end, we propose an adaptive
partitioning mechanism (see Section 4) that can accommo-
date transaction volumes by dynamically grouping shards
in partitions and processing transactions in partition basis.
As a result, shards’ resources can be optimally utilized and
the network burden can be minimized.
2.2.3 PPAP consensus protocol. Designing a consensus pro-
tocol for a scalable blockchain is very challenging. First, the
consensus protocol should be able to avoid Sybil attacks [11] -
a common attack in open, decentralized environments where
an adversary (i.e., a malicious user) can create multiple iden-
tities to influence the protocol. Moreover, the consensus
protocol must be scale to high transaction volumes in an
energy-efficient way. To address these challenges, we pro-
pose probably secure PoS-based consensus protocol, named
Parallel Proof-of-Active-Participation (PPAP, see Section 5),
where active (or online) participates (i.e., nodes) are randomly
selected (with probability proportional to their tokens) reach
the consensus on partitions in parallel. We investigate the
relationship between security guarantees of PPAP and the
system activity and honest threshold.
2.3 The Hybrid Network
Due to the huge communication cost of broadcasting mes-
sages from one node to all the other nodes in the system
and reaching consensus in partitions, we propose a hybrid
network to minimize the information propagation latency,
which is defined as the combination of transmission time
and the local verification of the message.
As shown in Fig. 1, the proposed hybrid network consists
of : 1) a relay network, which consists of a small set of relay
nodes that forward messages (e.g., transactions, blocks, etc.)
in a many-to-many manner, and 2) a P2P network, where
every node only broadcast its own messages to its neighbors,
while broadcasting or forwarding the hashes of messages
signed by other nodes in a gossip manner.
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Figure 1: Fission’s Hybrid Network.
2.3.1 The relay network. The purpose of the relay network
is to minimize the information propagation latency via re-
ducing the number of hops that messages traverse before
they reach all the online nodes. The relay network consists of
a set of inter-connected relayers (servers with high network
capacity and good hardware specifications) such that every
relayer is incentivized (via collecting a portion of transaction
fees and block rewards) to deliver every message to a large
number of nodes simultaneously.
Specifically, each node will select one relayer to broad-
cast messages, and update, synchronize its local copy of the
blockchain. To avoid garbage messages that may overwhelm
the relay network, every relayer must validate messages
(based on their signatures) before relaying them to the whole
network. Furthermore, the relay network will forward all
the hashes of messages, but only deliver the corresponding
messages when nodes request. Due to the system dynamics
that incurs dynamic and unpredictable loads on the relayer,
it is plausible that nodes can effectively select or change their
relayers, such that the overall system will not be vulnerable
to those relayers that are under-performing or under DDoS
attacks.
Instead of deploying the relay network and managing the
relayer selection in a centralized way, we design and im-
plement the relay network in a strongly distributed setting.
Specifically, Fission enables every node to selfishly indepen-
dently and concurrently select relayer that maximizes its
own profit (i.e., lower propagation latency) without any cen-
tral control. We prove in Section 6.4 that the expected in-
formation propagation latency is minimized once the loads
on relayers are balanced proportional to their capacities, in
which case a Nash equilibrium is achieved.
It is important to note that without accommodating the
system dynamics and network heterogeneity in the relay
network, the performance of any relay selection strategy
may be detrimental in practice. To this end, we then propose
a game-theoretic distributed algorithm, named Probabilis-
tic Relay Selection (PRS) that leads the system to ϵ-Nash
equilibrium in an ultra-fast5 O(loglogN r) convergence time
from any prior system state (i.e., load distribution in the relay
network), where N r is the number of relayers.
2.3.2 The P2P network. Fission’s P2P network is based on
the Kademlia DHT [28], which is designed to be an efficient
means for storing and finding content in a P2P network.
Unlike other blockchains like Ethereum, where the Kademlia
DHT is used only for node discovery, Fission fully utilizes
the DHT-based P2P network as a highly available distributed
storage system, similar to IPFS [2].
5We follow the common use of the superlative “ultra” for double-logarithmic
bounds [9, 19]
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Similar to other blockchain P2P networks, transactions
are disseminated in Fission’s P2P network in a gossip-like
manner. Besides, all the nodes will send their transactions
to their relayers who help them to reach the whole network
in 2 hops. Unlike existing blockchains, Fission’s nodes do
not forward blocks to their neighbors, although the block
hashes are gossiped in the P2P network. In such a way, block
information (i.e., block hash) can be propagated (with help of
the relay network) to the whole network as soon as possible.
Upon receiving a block hash, a node will choose to re-
trieve the block if it is selected as a committee member for
the block. Otherwise it will ignore it (to effectively utilize
the network resource). In Fission, every node can retrieve a
block (based on its hash) from a content provider, defined as
the node that has a local copy of data, with a lower fee, or
from the relay network with a higher fee. In addition, if a
node is a committee member for a block, it needs to retrieve
the block within a latency constraint (measured in seconds),
otherwise it may miss the voting process, and as a result,
lost the chance to get the block rewards. To minimize the
cost of data retrieval with time constraints, we propose an
online and light-weight data retrieval strategy that achieves
a good trade-off between performance and complexity.
3 EAGER-LAZY PIPELING
Although sharding promises to improve the throughput and
reduce per-node processing and storage requirements, exist-
ing sharding-based blockchains still require a linear amount
of communication per transaction (to sync up every transac-
tion among different shards), and thus attain only partially
benefits of sharding.
To this end, we introduce a novel Eager-Lazy pipeling
model to improve the system throughput via transaction
pipeling. Specifically, each atomic transaction in Fission is di-
vided into two successive and independent sub-transactions:
1) the eager sub-transaction (e.g., withdrawing tokens from
the payer), and 2) the corresponding lazy sub-transaction
(e.g., depositing tokens to the payee), as shown in Fig. 2.
Eager transaction
$10
­ $10
Lazy transactionAtomic transaction
+ $10
Alice AliceBob Bob
Figure 2: Transform between an atomic transaction
and its corresponding eager and lazy sub-transactions.
The proposed Eager-Lazy pipeling overcomes the limita-
tions of sharding-base solution via avoiding i.e., high cross-
shard communication. Fission confirms each atomic transac-
tion via confirming the two sub-transactions separately and
independently in the two successive blocks. In other words,
all the eager sub-transactions will be confirmed in a block,
referenced by another block containing all the correspond-
ing lazy sub-transactions. As a result, Fission introduces two
types of blocks: 1) the interim block that stores all the con-
firmed eager sub-transactions, and 2) the main block that
stores all the confirmed lazy sub-transactions.
Block 
null
Block Block 
prevHash 
interimHash 
txRoot[] 
txLogRoot[] 
accountRoot[] ...
prevHash 
interimHash 
txRoot[] 
txLogRoot[] 
accountRoot[] ...
prevHash 
interimHash 
txRoot[] 
txLogRoot[] 
accountRoot[] ...
Figure 3: Fission’s blockchain structure.The interim
and main blocks are appended alternatively.
Fission blockchain proceeds in fixed time periods called
epochs. In every epoch, a new block that contains a set of
sub-transactions is appended to the blockchain. Therefore,
the blockchain consists of a sequence of concatenated blocks
< B0,B1, · · · >, where i ≥ 0 indicates the epoch number. As
shown in Fig. 3, blocks are appended to the blockchain in an
alternating way such that Bi is a main block if and only if i
mod 2 = 0, otherwise it is an interim block.
3.1 Micro Block
Note that all the sub-transactions will be processed in par-
allel with the proposed adaptive partitioning mechanism
(explained in Section 4). Upon reaching a consensus, a mi-
cro block that contains all the confirmed sub-transactions
in a partition will be generated and broadcast to all the par-
tition committee members. Otherwise, the corresponding
transactions will be processed in the next round.
TxRoot[] AccountRoot[]TxLogRoot[]
Shard
Partition
Figure 4: Fission’s block structure.
3.2 Interim Block
An interim block is a combination of all the micro blocks
that contains the eager sub-transactions. The transactions,
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the account table, and the transaction logs are distributed in
shards (not partitions), simply based on the public keys of
the senders. As shown in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4, each interim block
contains three Merkle root arrays, each of which is a array
of Merkle root of each shard. It should be noted that not all
the eager sub-transactions in a partition can be processed
within ∆micro (i.e., , the time constraint for a micro block)
due to both the heterogeneous complexity of transactions
(e.g., some of them are one-to-many fund transfers, or smart
contracts), and the heterogeneous computation capacities of
committee members in a partition. An interim block will be
generated by the (interim) block committee by combining
all the micro blocks from all the partitions within a time
constraint ∆interim. Once a consensus is reached, the interim
blockwill be appended to the blockchain, otherwise an empty
interim block will be appended.
3.3 Main Block
Once an interim block is appended to the blockchain, a
(main) block committee will be selected to reach a consensus
on a main block that contains the corresponding lazy sub-
transactions within a time constraint ∆main. Considering that
lazy sub-transactions are basically credit operations based
on logs of the eager sub-transactions (e.g., txLogRoot[]) in
the interim block, they are supposed to be processed much
faster than eager sub-transactions. Furthermore, all the cor-
responding lazy sub-transactions in the interim block need
to be confirmed in the main block which reference the in-
terim block by interimHash in the block header. Otherwise,
an empty main block will be appended.
4 ADAPTIVE PARTITIONING
Allocation of resources to processing transactions in parallel
is challenging for blockchains of all sizes. Carving out or al-
locating parts of the system to run tasks without interfering
with each other is commonly referred to as “partitioning”.
Partitioning, in general, is the ability to divide up system
resources into groups of parts in order to facilitate particular
functions. Recently, some partitioning scheme have been pro-
posed which partition a blockchain into persistent or static
partitions (i.e., shards). However, the capacities of the paral-
lel partitions would be underutilized if only a fixed number
of transactions were to be proceeded on the fixed number
of shards. In order to perform efficient scheduling of re-
sources, we propose an adaptive partitioning mechanism to
process transactions parallelly in different partitions, instead
of shards. System performance can be further improved by
adaptively determining the number of shards allocated to a
partition based on the transaction volumes.
Each partition consists of one or multiple shards, each of
which consists of eager or lazy sub-transactions, account
table, and transaction logs assigned to it based on the public
keys of senders and accounts, respectively. The sub-transactions
in each partition will be processed and a micro block (see
Section 3.1) will be generated and agreed by a small group of
nodes, called partition committee, randomly selected using
PPAP protocol based on the latest block and the partition in-
dex. Specifically, let j be a shard index, then it will be assigned
to a partition with index k ≡ j mod N p , where N p ≤ N s is
the total number of partitions. The value of N p is contained
in every block header, and it is adjusted based on the latest
transaction volumes.
4.1 Number of Partitions
The purpose of the proposed adaptive partitioning mech-
anism is to reach consensus on the final block as soon as
possible respecting the fluctuation of transaction volumes.
The larger the number of transactions is, more partitions are
required such that partitions are not overloaded. In Fission,
a simple auto-scaling strategy is applied to determine the
number of partitions as follows: Let N ei and N
p
i be the num-
ber of confirmed eager sub-transactions, and the number of
partitions in the latest block Bi , respectively. The number of
partitions for the next block Bi+1, denoted by N pi+1 is derived
as following:
N
p
i+1 =

N
p
i + 1, if
N ei
N pi
≥ δN emax
N
p
i − 1, if
N ei
N pi
≤ (1 − δ )N emax
N
p
i , otherwise
,
where N emax is the maximum number of sub-transactions a
partition can process, and δ ∈ (0, 1) is a scale factor. Both
N emax and δ are pre-determined in Fission, and they can be
adjusted for the best practice.
4.2 Re-Sharding
Note that the state and storage information of nodes are
organized using Merkle tree structure, which is essentially
a binary tree. It is straightforward and efficient to increase
the number of shards by splitting a Merkle tree into two
or more Merkle trees. Re-sharding will be triggered auto-
matically if there are a number of successive main blocks,
say (Bi ,Bi+1, . . . ,Bi+N r s ), we have N pj = N sj , for all j ∈
[i, i +N r s ], where N sj denotes the number of shards in block
Bj , and N r s is a pre-determined number.
5 PPAP CONSENSUS
Byzantine agreement protocols, e.g., PBFT[8], have been used
to sync up states among a relatively small group of servers,
and it has been used in other blockchains to reach consensus.
However, PBFT requires a fixed number of servers acting
like bootstrapping nodes thus those blockchains may be
6
vulnerable to Sybil attacks. Moreover, it does not scale to
a large number of nodes (say over 100,000 nodes) who are
participating in the consensus process.
To scale the Fission’s consensus process to many online
nodes, a small group of nodes are selected (see Section 5.2)
as the committee for each partition and block at each epoch.
Once the nodes are selected and their voting power are de-
termined, a Byzantine agreement protocol is executed by
every selected node (i.e., every committee member) to reach
a consensus on the new block.
Fission’s consensus process is purely decentralized such
that every node can be selected as a committee member. To
avoid Sybil attacks, where adversaries may create millions
of nodes with negligible tokens to increase the probability of
being selected, and thus increase the probability of append-
ing malicious blocks, Fission enables nodes to be selected
randomly with probability proportional to their tokens, and
their voting power are proportional to their tokens. As a
result, Fission’s consensus protocol is a PoS-based protocol.
5.1 Active Participation
Furthermore, Fission’s consensus protocol relies on the ac-
tive participation of nodes, who improve the security and
performance of the system by verifying transactions and
voting for the new blocks to be appended to the blockchain.
It is worth to note that all the blockchains require active
participation from their users. Without the participation
of users, the security of blockchains cannot be guaranteed.
Therefore, Fission’s consensus protocol is named as Paral-
lel Proof-of-Active-Participation, PPAP in short, where the
security of Fission is guaranteed by online nodes who are ac-
tively participating the transactions/blocks verification and
block producing.
5.2 Committee Selection
In Fission, committees are randomly selected from all the
online nodes at each epoch e in a non-interactive manner,
with probability proportional to their tokens (i.e., stakes).
Let Ve = ∪i ∈Z+ {vi } and Se = ∪i ∈Z+ {si } denote the set of
all the active nodes, and the set of their tokens at epoch
e ∈ Z+, respectively. Consider every node, say vi performs a
Bernoulli trial on every token it has. Let p be the probability
of success in the Bernoulli trial. Then the probability of being
selected is 1 − (1 − p)si , and the expected voting power is
p × si . Therefore, the voting power of node vi , defined as
oi , is a random variable follows Binomial distribution, i.e.,
oi ∼ B(si ,p). The cumulative distribution function (CDF) for
oi is defined as the following:
F (k ; si ,p) = Pr(oi ≤ k) =
k∑
j=0
(
si
j
)
p j (1 − p)si−j (1)
To generate the oi given si ,p for each vi ∈ Ve , we use a
simple algorithm based on the inverse transform method
[21], as shown in Fig. 5 and Algorithm 1. Specifically, every
Figure 5: Calculating voting power of vi using inverse
transform method. x is random number uniformly
distributed in [0, 1], andy is themaximum integer such
that y ≤ F−1(x). Then the voting power of vi is y.
node will generate a random number, say x from a uniform
distribution on the interval (0, 1) (Line 1 of Algorithm 1).
Then it compares x with F (0; si ,p) = (1−p)si (i.e., the proba-
bility that none of si tokens is selected) and stop and return
0 if x is not greater, as shown in Lines 2-3 of Algorithm 1.
The inverse CDF (i.e., F−1(x)) is used to calculate the voting
power of oi given the random number x , and si ,p.
Algorithm 1: Calculating voting power given (si ,p).
1 Generate x from uniform distribution X ∼ U(0, 1) ;
2 if x ≤ F (0; si ,p) then
3 Return 0;
4 Return sup{y ∈ Z+ : F (y) ≤ F−1(x)};
Every node in Fission uses VRFs [29] to generate ran-
dom numbers to calculate their voting power. Because VRFs
allows other node to verify those numbers efficiently. Fur-
thermore, it enables nodes to calculate their voting power in
a non-interactive and independent manner. Let Be denote the
block at epoch e , and let seede denote the seed information
used by all online nodes to calculate their voting power for
the next block Be+1. Every node, say vi ∈ Ve , will generate a
tuple using VRF as follows:
(hashei ,π ei ) = VRF (ski , seede , type), (2)
where hashei is a 256-bit long pseudo-random value that is
uniquely determined by ski (private key of node vi ), seede
(random seed of block Be ), and the type of committee (e.g.,
partition or block committee), but is indistinguishable from
random to any node that does not know ski . π ei is the proof
that anyone can verify thathashei is valid with the knowledge
of pki , the public key of node vi . Therefore, the random
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number that is used to calculate voting power of node vi
given si ,p is hashei /2256.
Considering that it is impractical to assumeVe or n = |Ve |
is known as a prior, we choose p as a pre-determined value
which does not depend on dynamic, unpredictable informa-
tion. Specifically, p = τ/K , where K is the total number of
tokens, and τ is the expected number of tokens selected.
Choosing a good τ is very important as it affects both the
performance and the security guarantee of the consensus
algorithm, and we will discuss it in Section 5.4.
5.3 Byzantine Agreement
Fission’s Byzantine agreement works roughly as follows: for
each block committee, a block proposer will be elected to
propose a new block. Specifically, at the beginning of every
epoch e , every block committee member vi ∈ Ve generates a
ticket as follows:
ticketi = VRF (ski , seede , “leader”) (3)
Then block committee members then gossip their tickets
with each other for a time ∆leader, after which they elect
the valid ticket with the lowest value they have seen and
accept the corresponding node as the block proposer, i.e.,
leader. If this leader is or becomes unavailable, leadership
passes to the next node in ascending order of tickets. Then
the block proposer will broadcast the hash of the candidate
block to the whole network. Upon received this hash, every
block committee member will retrieve the block (from its
relayer or other nodes) before verifying all the transactions
in the block, and then broadcast its votes with its signature.
Once the block proposer receive enough votes (i.e., ≥ θ , see
Section 5.4 for more details) on the new block, it will gossip
the confirmed block to the whole network, where each node
will append this block to its local copy of the blockchain.
5.4 Security Guarantee
Let Sh , and Sa denote the total number of tokens owned
by the online honest nodes, and adversaries (i.e., malicious
users), respectively. Let h be the honesty threshold, indicating
the fraction of tokens that are owned by honest nodes, i.e.,
Sh = h(Sh + Sa). Let α be the activity of system, defined as
the fraction of tokens that are owned by the online nodes.
Therefore, we have (Sh + Sa) = αK .
Let Xh and Xa denote the number of tokens selected (via
executing Algorithm 1) from honest nodes, and adversaries,
respective. As discussed in Section 5.2, we haveXh ∼ B(Sh ,p),
and Xa ∼ B(Sa ,p), that is both Xh and Xa follow the bino-
mial distribution. Note that Sh and Sa are sufficient large6,
thus both B(Sh ,p) and B(Sa ,p) can be approximated with
6Which means Shp > 5, Sap > 5
Normal distribution as follows:
Xh ∼ N(µh ,σ 2h), µh = Shp,σ 2h = Shp(1 − p) (4)
Xa ∼ N(µa ,σ 2a), µa = Sap,σ 2a = Sap(1 − p) (5)
Define Y = Xh − 2Xa , and it also follows Normal dis-
tribution, i.e., Y ∼ N (µy ,σ 2y ), where µy = (3h − 2)ατ , and
σ 2y = (4 − 3h)ατ . To ensure the consensus is reached on
valid blocks, the fraction of selected tokens are owned by
adversaries should be less than 1/3. Therefore, the probability
Pr(Y ≤ 0) should be negligible given h and α . We transform
Y to a random variable Z , which follows a standard normal
distribution,i.e., Z ∼ N (0, 1), then we have the following:
Pr(Y ≤ 0) = Pr
(
Z ≤ − µy
σy
)
≈ Pr
(
Z ≤ − (3h − 2)ατ√(4 − 3h)ατ
)
.
(6)
Considering Pr(Z ≤ −6.36) ≤ 10−10, hence we have
τ >
40.5(4 − 3h)
(3h − 2)2α (7)
To ensure that a consensus on a valid block can be reached
in a non-interactive manner, the fraction of weights (i.e.,
votes), denoted by θ , needs to be pre-determined such that a
block is valid with high probability (i.e., > 1 − 10−10) if there
are more than θτ votes are received on the block. Hence
Pr(Xa ≥ θτ ) and Pr(Xh < θτ ) should be negligible, even the
activity of system (i.e., α ) is relative low, as shown below:
Pr(Xa ≥ θτ ) = Pr
(
Z ≥ θτ − µa
σa
)
< 10−10
Pr(Xh < θτ ) = Pr
(
Z <
θτ − µh
σh
)
< 10−10,
(8)
where Z ∼ N (0, 1) is a random variable follows standard
normal distribution. Considering Pr(Z > 6.36) < 10−10 and
Pr(Z < −6.36) < 10−10, hence we have
(1 − h)α + 6.36
√
(1 − h)α
τ
< θ < hα − 6.36
√
hα
τ
(9)
Note that one of most secure and well-adopted blockchain,
Bitcoin, is still vulnerable to attacks (e.g., selfish mining[15])
if adversaries control over 25% of hashrate. We assume that
the honest threshold of the system, h, should be larger than
0.75. Otherwise Fission will be vulnerable to attacks by ad-
versaries. As the right part of Eq. 7 is a monotone and non-
increasing function over h, we have τ > 1134α given h ≥ 0.75.
To satisfy Eq. 9 under the same assumption of h ≥ 0.75, τ
should be relative large to be adaptive to different activity of
system, i.e., α . However, a larger τ results in a higher com-
munication cost, thus τ needs to be determined considering
the trade-off between the communication cost and security.
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Specifically, based on Eq. 9 and Eq. 7, we have the lower
bound of θ given h ≥ 0.75 and α ∈ [0, 1]:
θ > (1 − h)α + 6.36
√
(1 − h)α
τ
>
1
4 +
3.18√
τ
.
(10)
In Fission we set τ = 5000, and θ = 0.3. Therefore, to satisfy
the right inequation of Eq. 9, we have
hα − 6.36
√
hα
5000 > 0.3, (11)
and thus α > 0.53. Therefore, given h ≥ 0.75, α > 0.53, and
τ = 5000, a consensus on a valid block can be reached w.h.p.
if over 1500 votes are received.
6 THE RELAY NETWORK
The relay network of Fission is a mesh network consists of a
group of relayers who contribute their resources (e.g., band-
width, memory and computation) to propagate messages
(e.g., transactions, blocks, etc.). With relayers, all messages
can be delivered within at most 3 hops, thus the information
propagation latency is significantly reduced.
The relay network in Fission is implemented in a strong
practical and distributed settings: 1) there are no oracle or
centralized authorities managing or controlling the relay-
ers, 2) each relayer has no knowledge (e.g., load, number of
connections, etc.) about other relayers, and 3) relayers have
heterogeneous bandwidth capacities and hardware specifi-
cations, and both can vary over time.
To achieve the optimal propagation latency in the dis-
tributed settings, nodes need to change their relayers from
overloaded ones to underloaded ones independently and con-
currently (see Section 6.1). However, It can be observed that if
all nodes behave greedily at each step (i.e., , they select those
relayers with minimum load deterministically), the system
may not converge to a steady state [4]. To guarantee that the
system will converge rapidly, some probability rules need to
be imposed for all nodes when they decide to change their
strategies at each step. In Fission , we proposed a probabilis-
tic relayer selection algorithm, called PRS (see Section 6.4),
which leads the system converge to an ϵ-Nash equilibrium
(see Section 6.2) where a near-optimal propagation latency
is achieved.
6.1 Relay Selection and Update
After joining the system, every node vi ∈ V will randomly
select a relayer, denoted bymj ∈ M with probability propor-
tional to their advertised bandwidth capacities, and then it
will invoke a periodic relay update process to choose a better
relayer every ∆relay seconds (the update interval).
At each step, node vi randomly selects a different relayer,
defined as the relay candidate, in the system. Node vi will
potentially replace the current relayer with the relay candi-
date using Algorithm 2, detailed in Section 6.4. It is worth
noting that every node will incur a certain load on its relayer.
The load ofmj ∈ M , denoted by lj , is defined as the number
of nodes that choosemj as their relayer, and the load ratio
ofmj , denoted by r j , is defined as lj/uj .
6.2 Minimizing Propagation Delay
The key performance metric for information propagation
in bandwidth constrained networked environments is the
averaged propagation latency. In Fission , every node will
send themessage (transactions and blocks) and its hash to the
relayer, who then forward the message to all the connected
nodes who did not receive the message yet. Therefore, the
distribution of loads on the relayers will significantly affect
the propagation delay.
Considering that relayers have heterogeneous and time-
varying resources in practice, we investigate the problem of
minimizing expected information propagation delay respect-
ing the heterogeneous bandwidth constraints, as shown in
Theorem 6.1. We then propose a game-theoretic relay selec-
tion algorithm, i.e., PRS, to minimize the averaged informa-
tion propagation delay in a fully distributed manner.
Theorem 6.1. LetV = ∪i ∈Z+ {vi } be the set of online nodes.
Let M = ∪i ∈Z+ {mi } and U = ∪i ∈Z+ {ui } be the set of relay-
ers and their advertised upload capacities, respectively. Given
any distribution of load ratios on the relayers, r, the expected
averaged information propagation delay, denoted by E(r), is
minimized if and only if ∀ri ∈ r, ri = r = |V ||U | .
Proof. As every node selects a relayer u.a.r., the number
of messages to be propagated by a relayer is proportional to
its load (i.e., number of nodes that select it as the relayer).
Therefore, the expected number of message to be propagated
by the relayer lj/|V |. For every message,mj is supposed to
forward to lj nodes, thus the propagation delay incurred on
relayermj is
wl 2i
ui |V | , wherew denotes the averaged message
size. Furthermore, the problem of minimizing the expected
propagation delay for any node vi ∈ V is formulated as the
following
minimize : E(r) = w|V |
∑
mi ∈M
l2i
ui
, (12)
s.t. :
∑
mi ∈M
li = |V |, (13)
By the method of Lagrange multipliers, E(r) is minimized if
li
ui
=
lj
uj
,∀mi ,mj ∈ M , and this completes the proof. □
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Theorem 6.1 implies that to minimize the expected propa-
gation delay, the loads on the relayers must be balanced pro-
portionally to their advertised upload bandwidth. To achieve
a scalable system, our goal is to distribute and balance the
loads on the relayers in a fully distributed manner. We then
formulate the distributed load balancing problem as an asym-
metric congestion game, where each player (i.e., node) in the
game can change his/her strategy (i.e., relayer) individually
and concurrently.
6.3 Congestion Game Preliminaries
The classical congestion games have been investigated for
many years. A congestion game, denoted byG , can be defined
as a tuple (V ,M, (Ai )i ∈V , (fe )e ∈M ), where V denotes the set
of players andM denotes a set of facilities. Each player i ∈ V
is assigned a finite set of strategies Ai and a cost function fe
is associated with facility e ∈ M .
To play the game, each player i ∈ V selects a strategy
ai ⊆ Ai , where Ai ⊆ M is the strategy set of player i . The
strategy profile, denoted by a = (ai )i ∈V , is defined as a vector
of strategies selected by all the players. Similarly we use
the notation A = ×i ∈VAi to denote the set of all possible
strategy profiles. A congestion game is symmetric if all the
players have the same strategy set, i.e., ∀i, j ∈ V ,Ai = Aj ;
otherwise it is asymmetric. A congestion game is weighted
if each player i is specified a weightwi . The cost of player i
for the strategy profile a is given by ci (a) = fai (a,wi ).
The goal of each player in congestion games is to min-
imize her own cost without trying to optimize the global
situation. That is, all players will try to lower their own cost
by changing their strategies individually. A pure Nash equi-
librium is defined as a steady state in which no players have
an incentive to change their strategies.
Definition 6.2 (Pure Nash equilibrium [31]). A strategy pro-
file a ∈ A is said to be a pure Nash equilibrium of G if for
all players i ∈ V and each alternate strategy a′i ∈ Ai ,
ci (ai , a−i ) ≤ ci (a′i , a−i ), (14)
where a−i = (aj )j ∈V \{i } denotes the list of strategies of the
strategy profile a for all players except i .
Congestion games have a fundamental property that a
pure Nash equilibrium always exists [16]. To analyze conver-
gence properties of congestion games (i.e., the time from any
state to a pure Nash equilibrium), we introduce the definition
of potential function for congestion games.
Definition 6.3 (Potential function [13]). A functionΦ : A →
R is a potential for game G if ∀a ∈ A, ∀ai ,aj ∈ Ai ,
ci (ai , a−i ) ≤ ci (aj , a−i ) ⇒ Φ(ai , a−i ) ≤ Φ(aj , a−i ). (15)
Therefore, a∗ is a Nash equilibrium if and only if
a∗ = argmin
a∈A
Φ(a). (16)
An ϵ-Nash equilibrium is an approximate Nash equilib-
rium, which is defined as a state in which no player can
reduce her cost by a multiplicative factor of less than 1 − ϵ
by changing her strategy.
We define a potential function to associate the expected
propagation delay with r = (r1, r2, . . . ), which is the load
ratio vector on the relayers:
Φ(r) =
|M |∑
ri ∈r
(ri − r )2, (17)
where r = |V |/|U | is the optimal load ratio. The potential
function has the property that if node vi switches from a
relayer with a high load ratio to another relayer with a low
load ratio, Φ(r) will decrease accordingly.
Note that every node is selfish and will change its strategy
to lower its own cost at each step. This will result in Nash
dynamics – i.e., Φ(r) will fluctuate over time. To guarantee
that the system converges to a steady state rapidly, a set of
probability distributions overAi (i.e., strategy set) needs to be
assigned to each nodevi ∈ V . That is, all the nodes’ strategies
are nondeterministic and are regulated by a probabilistic rule.
6.4 Probabilistic Relayer Selection (PRS)
We now present the probabilistic relay selection (PRS) algo-
rithm based on an asymmetric congestion game. PRS enables
each node to update its relayer as follows (shown in Algo-
rithm 2). At each step, node vi that selects a relayermj will
contact a relay candidatemk with probability proportional
to its advertised upload bandwidth. At the same time it finds
the load and the capacity of mk (i.e., the relay candidate).
Let r j and rk be the load ratios ofmj andmk , respectively.
If r j > rk , then vi replacesmj withmk with a probability,
denoted by Pr(j,k), shown as below:
Pr(j,k) =

ui
|U |
(
1 − rkr j
)
if r j > rk ,
0 if j , k, r j ≤ rk ,
1 −∑j,k Pr(j,k) if j = k . (18)
where uk is the advertised upload capacity ofmk , and |U | is
the total advertised upload capacities of all the relayers.
For very relayermk ∈ M , the probability of being selected
as a candidate relayer is uk|U | . Our solution is to maintain
an identifier space, which can be managed either by a dis-
tributed scheme (e.g., using DHT), or by a centralized scheme
(i.e., using a server to store all the identifiers). Each identi-
fier consists of a relayer ID (i.e., , its name or IP address)
and a randomly generated hash key. To let a relayer to be
chosen probabilistically proportional to its upload capacity,
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each relayermk will maintain ukµ identifiers, where µ is a
scalar value measured by Kbps. Therefore, at each step of
the relayer update process, node vi will choose an identi-
fier from the identifier space u.a.r. (uniformly at random),
hence, the probability of relayermk to be contacted by vi , is
proportional to its upload capacity uk .
Algorithm 2: Probabilistic Relayer Selection
1 ∀vi ∈ V that selectsmi ∈ M , do the following
2 Select and contactmk ∈ M .
3 whilemk is unreachable do
4 Go to line 2
5 Let r j and rk be the load ratios ofmj andmk ,
respectively
6 if r j > rk then
7 Replacemj withmk with probability
(
1 − rkr j
)
An important criteria to evaluate distributed algorithms
is the convergence time, which is a measure of how fast the
algorithm leads the system reaches a steady state. Otherwise
system dynamics may significantly degrade the performance.
We analyze the upper bound of the convergence time of PRS,
where all the nodes behave simultaneously at each step.
Let rt and rt+1 be the load ratio vectors of the current step
t and the next step t + 1, respectively. Let rit = li/ui denote
the load ratio of relayer mi at time t . Since we consider
a highly dynamic and heterogeneous environment where
nodes can join, leave and make transactions at will, we are
especially interested to show how fast PRS can lead the
system to converge to a ϵ-Nash equilibrium. We observe
that maxΦϵ -Nash = ϵ
2m
4 , where m is the total number of
relayers. Hence we say that a ϵ-Nash equilibrium is reached
at time t if Φ(rt ) = O(m).
Theorem 6.4. Letm be the number of relayers, and letΦ(rt )
be the potential function of the relayers at any step t . Then,
the upper bound on the number of steps that Φ(rt ) requires to
reach a ϵ-Nash equilibrium is O(log logm).
Proof. To better structure the proof, we introduce two
supporting lemmas provided in the Appendix. Given any
step t , we observe from Lemma A.1 that the expected load
ratio of any node at step t + 1 is the optimal load ratio r .
Lemma A.2 provides an upper bound of the variance of load
ratios at step t+1. Consider E [Φ(rt+1)], which is the expected
value of the potential function at step t + 1:
E [Φ(rt+1)] = E
[
m∑
i=1
(
rit+1 − r
)2]
. (19)
Note that all the nodes behave independently at each step
(i.e., select a relayer with lower load ratio), hence rt+1 is
independent of rt . It follows that
E [Φ(rt+1)] =
m∑
i=1
E
[ (
rit+1
)2] − 2r m∑
i=1
E
[
rit+1
]
+mr 2. (20)
Lemma A.1 indicates that the expectation of each relayer
mi , E
[
rit+1
]
, is r at each step, hence we have
E [Φ(rt+1)] =
m∑
i=1
E
[ (
rit+1
)2] −mr 2
=
m∑
i=1
Var
[
rit+1
] ≤ (mΦ(rt )) 12 . (21)
We observe that the square-root function is concave. There-
fore, by Jensen’s inequality, the expected value of the poten-
tial function at step t + 1 is
E [Φ(rt+1)] ≤ E
[
(mΦ(rt )) 12
]
≤ (m E [Φ(rt )]) 12 . (22)
Since E [Φ(rt )] > 0 for any step t ≥ 0, we define a function
f (t) = log(E [Φ(rt )]), and we have the following
f (t + 1) ≤ logm2 +
f (t)
2 . (23)
After λ ∈ Z steps from any step t ≥ 0,
f (t + λ) ≤
(
1 − 1
2λ
)
logm + 1
2λ
f (t)
≤ logm + 1
2λ
f (t). (24)
Therefore, the expected value of the potential function
after λ steps from any step t ≥ 0 is
E [Φ(rt+λ)] ≤ m E [Φ(rt )]2−λ . (25)
The upper bound of Φ(r) is O(m2), which occurs in the
case when every node vi selects one specific relayermj ∈ M .
Hence, the upper bound of f (t) is O(logm), i.e., there exists
an integer a ∈ Z such that sup f (t) ≤ a logm. Therefore,
it suffices to show that there exists a λ = ⌈log(a logm)⌉ ∼
O(log logm), such that f (λ)2λ ≤ 1. Hence, for any t ≥ 0, it
suffices to show that
E [Φ(rt+λ)] ≤ 2m, (26)
where λ = O(log logm). By Markov’s inequality, we have
Pr(Φ(rt+λ) ≥ 4m) ≤ E [Φ(rt+λ)]4m ≤
1
2 . (27)
Let τ be the first time such that Φ(rt+τ ) ≤ 4m occurs from
any step t . Flip a coin after each of λ steps untilΦ(rt+τ ) ≤ 4m:
Pr(τ = iλ)
{≥ p if i = 1,
≤ p(1 − p)i−1 if i ≥ 2, (28)
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where p = Pr(Φ(rt+λ) ≤ 4m), thus 0.5 ≤ p < 1. Therefore,
E[τ ] =
∞∑
i=1
iλ Pr(τ = iλ)
≤ λ + 14λ
∞∑
i=2
(1 − p)i−2
≤
(
1 + 14p
)
λ ≤ 32λ. (29)
By Markov’s inequality, Pr(τ ≥ 60λ) ≤ E[τ ]60λ = 0.025.
Conversely, Pr(Φ(rt+60λ) ≤ 4m) ≥ 0.975. As a result, from
any state, the system can rapidly (within O(log logm) steps)
converge to a ϵ-Nash equilibrium, where the load ratios of
the nodes are approximately balanced.
□
6.5 Incentive
Note that non-cooperative or malicious behaviors in may
significantly adversely affect the entire network via flooding
the relay networkwith invalidmessages. To this end, relayers
will verify every message they received before propagating
it to other relayers or nodes. This also enables relayers to
identify malicious nodes, and then limit the effect of such
attacks. Besides, It incurs bandwidth costs to deliver large
traffic volumes to a large number of nodes.
To ensure Fission’s sustainability and robustness, relayers
are incentivized to relay messages as quickly as possible,
helping partition or block committees to win the race for
block rewards (deterministically, the first θ votes for blocks).
One possible approach is to apply a subscription-basedmodel
that every node will pay a rental fee to its relayer. Another
approach is to open a payment channel between every node
and its relayer such that each payment on a single message
is paid in an on-demand basis. We will detail the incentive
mechanism in our future work and implementations.
7 THE P2P NETWORK
Unlike other blockchains’ P2P network, where messages are
delivered in a gossip-like manner, Fission’s P2P network
takes advantage of P2P content-sharing capabilities of Bit-
Torrent or IPFS. Combined with the relay network and the
P2P network, Fission provides an efficient, cost-effective, and
highly available distributed information storage and dissem-
ination solution that scales to high transactions volumes.
Specifically, only hashes of messages are gossiped in Fis-
sion’s P2P network. Hence Fission scales to large blocks.
However, it may require every node to retrieve the whole
content from either the relayer, or a node in the P2P net-
work immediately after it receives a hash from its neighbor
or relayer. For instance, a block committee member needs
to retrieve the to-be-verified block and vote for it within a
latency constraint (e.g., ∆interim or ∆main) in order to receive
the block rewards. To incentivize nodes to contribute their
resources (e.g., storage, bandwidth, etc.) to serve others, a
small amount of fee (in FIT) will be charged by the content
provider, which are the nodes having the required data in
their local storage. It should be noted that nodes should pay
less fees to the content providers than the relayers (usually
with much higher network capacities and hardware specifi-
cations) which provide a better QoS (i.e., Quality-of-Service)
in terms of latency.
Therefore, the challenge is to minimize nodes’ costs of
retrieving content while respecting 1) the latency constraints
of content, 2) the heterogeneous resource (e.g., bandwidth)
distribution on nodes, and 3) the system churn (nodes can
join and leave the system anytime). To address this chal-
lenge, we propose an online algorithm that minimize the
cost by optimally utilizing the bandwidth of nodes in a fully
decentralized manner.
7.1 Problem Formulation
LetV andW denote the set of online nodes and the set of data
(e.g., transactions, blocks, etc.) that is required by these nodes,
respectively. Let Pk ∈ V denote the set of content providers
who are online nodes that has data k in their storage. The
size of each data i ∈W , denoted bywi , is measured in units
of kilobytes (i.e., , KB). It should be noted that all the data is
splitted into chunks, in order to improve the data availability
and efficiency of retrieval. Let Qi = ∪j ∈V {q ji } be the set of
requests sent by all nodes for data i , where q ji denotes the
request sent by node j for content i . Theweight of the request
q ji be the size of the data (i.e., ,wi ). The latency constraint for
each data is denoted by d = min(∆eager,∆lazy), measured in
seconds. Without loss of generality, we assume online nodes
are heterogeneous and have different upload capacities. Let
ui denote the advertised upload capacity of node i , measured
in kilobytes per second, i.e., , KB/s.
Since the amount of data that can be delivered by node i
within the latency constraint is d · ui , and thus the relayers
will disseminate the rest of the amount of data, if any. There-
fore, the relayers will send max{li − d · ui , 0} of data due
to the inadequate upload capacity of node i . Our goal is to
maximize the data sent by nodes while respecting the upload
capacities of heterogeneous nodes and the latency constraints
of data, which is formulated as follows:
maximize:
∑
j ∈V
∑
k ∈W
wkx
j,i
k (30)
s.t.:
∑
i ∈Qk
∑
k ∈W
wkx
j,i
k ≤ d · ui , ∀q jk ∈ Qk , (31)
x j,ik ∈ {0, 1}, ∀q jk ∈ Qk . (32)
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where x j,ik is an indicator variable indicating whether the
request q jk is sent to node i . Specifically, if q
j
k is sent to node i ,
x j,ik = 1; otherwise x
j,i
k = 0. It can be observed that the objec-
tive (30) is a multidimensional knapsack problem [33], which
is NP-complete [20] in general. Many approaches have been
proposed to solve it, such as LP-relaxation [34], the primal-
dual method [6] and dynamic programming [35]. However,
these centralized approaches are not desirable and practical
since a global connectivity information among nodes and
the request information is required to obtain a feasible so-
lution. Moreover, there are existing decentralized [32] and
online [6, 12] algorithms that compute approximate solu-
tions within poly-logarithmic communication rounds, but
they are based on the assumption that each node has the
same capacity and is aware of global information, i.e., , it
knows about loads and upload capacities of nodes, and the
connectivity information between any two of them. Note
that the dual problem is to minimize the data sent by relayers,
given the same request set, which can be formally stated as
follows:
minimize:
∑
i ∈V
max{
∑
Qk,∅
∑
i ∈Qk
x j,ik wk − d · ui , 0} (33)
s.t.:
∑
i ∈Qk
x j,ik = 1, ∀r jk ∈ Qk (34)
x j,ik ∈ {0, 1}, ∀q jk ∈ Qk . (35)
Considering every request has only one provider. The load of
node i is li =
∑
Qk,∅
∑
i ∈Qk x
j,i
k wk . Therefore, the objective
(33) can be simplified to
minimize:
∑
i ∈V
max{li − d · ui , 0}, (36)
where max{li − d · ui , 0} is the amount of bandwidth con-
sumed by the relayers due to the inadequate upload capacity
of node i . Therefore, we transform the problem of maximiz-
ing the data sent by nodes into an asymmetric load balancing
problem: how to distribute the loads on overloaded nodes
(li > d · ui ) to underloaded nodes (li < d · ui ).
The objective of Fission’s P2P storage layer is to design
a P2P data retrieval strategy that can be implemented in a
decentralized and online fashion. To this end, we model the
P2P data retrieval problem as a congestion game and thus
inherit its practical and decentralized nature, which has been
successfully used to model load balancing problems in P2P
networks as well as many other real world applications due
to its conceptual simplicity.
7.2 Data Retrieval Strategy (DRS)
The objective (36) can be formulated as an asymmetric weighted
congestion game, de=noted by G, which is defined as
G = (Q, P , (Ai )i ∈Q , (fe )e ∈P ), (37)
where Q = ∪k ∈WQk and P = ∪k ∈PPk correspond to the set
of requests and the set of content providers, respectively.
Each request i ∈ Q has a weight wi (i.e., , the size of the
requested data), and each node i ∈ P has an upload capacity
ui . The strategy set of request i , denoted by Ai , is the set of
nodes Pi that have stored the requested data in their caches.
Since every request is sent to only one node at a time, G is a
singleton congestion game, i.e., ∀i ∈ Q , ai ∈ Ai .
The strategy profile of G, denoted by a = (ai )i ∈Q , corre-
sponds to the DRS7, and A = ×i ∈QAi corresponds to the
set of all possible DRSs. The cost of request i given a node
selection profile a is defined as
ci (a) = min{max{hi − d · uj , 0},wi }, (38)
where j = ai is the node selected by request i and hi is the
height 8 of request i at node j. Clearly, for each node j ∈ S ,
the sum of the cost of requests that select node j is∑
ai=j
ci (a) =
∑
ai=j
min{max{hi − d · uj , 0},wi } (39)
= max{lj − d · uj , 0}, ∀ai ∈ a. (40)
Recall that max{lj − d · uj , 0} is the amount of data that the
relayers will disseminate to the corresponding nodes due
to the upload capacity limitation of node j. We define the
potential function as the sum of the cost of all requests:
Φ(a) =
∑
j ∈P
∑
ai=j
ci (a) =
∑
j ∈P
max{lj − d · uj , 0}. (41)
Therefore, the problem of maximizing the data sent by nodes
can be solved by minimizing the potential function of the
corresponding congestion game.
It has been shown that finding a pure Nash equilibrium in
a congestion game is PLS-complete [16], hence the number
of changes of the strategy profile required from one state to
any pure Nash equilibrium is exponentially large. Therefore,
our goal is to quickly reach an approximate Nash equilibrium
from any state by enabling each node to change its strategies
for its requests according to a bounded jump rule (see lines 11
and 16 in Algorithm 3), which will be discussed later.
It is worth to point out that the offline data retrieval strate-
gies are undesirable in practice due to both the additional
delay they incur to find appropriate content providers for
all nodes, and the inefficient utilization of node bandwidth
(since the node bandwidth cannot be used to delivery data
during the process of finding a good node selection strategy).
7That is, choose which node to retrieve data from.
8All nodes serve retrieval requests in a FIFO manner.
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Furthermore, blockchains are highly dynamic environments
such that churn and time-varying node capacities will signif-
icantly degrade the feasibility and efficiency of offline data
retrieval strategies.
We introduce an online, light-weight data retrieval strat-
egy which maximizes the data sent by nodes by enabling
each node to repeatedly update its strategy for each data
that it requests. More specifically, all requests are sent by
nodes in a repeated fashion, i.e., , the strategy of each request
can be changed if (1) the current content provider of the
request is overloaded, and (2) the corresponding node finds
an underloaded provider within the latency constraint.
Algorithm 3: Data Retrieval Strategy.
1 Let t be the local time of node i ∈ N ;
2 Let tk be the time when qik is generated;
3 Let pki be the provider of the request qik ;
4 foreach qik ∈ Qk do
5 Contact a node j from Pk (d) u.a.r. ;
6 pki ← j;
7 Send qik to node p
k
i ;
8 Let hik be height of q
i
k at node j;
9 if hik ≤ d · uj then
10 Stop contacting other nodes;
11 while t ≤ tk + d and hik − (d − t + tk )upki ≥ wk do
12 Contact a node j ′ from Pk (d − t + tk ) u.a.r. ;
13 if timeout then
14 Go to line 11;
15 Let lj′ be the load of node j ′;
16 if lj′ ≤ (d − t + tk )uj′ then
17 pki ← j ′;
18 Send qik to node p
k
i ;
19 else
20 Go to line 11;
21 Let hik be height of q
i
k at node j
′;
22 if hik < wk + (d − t + tk ) · u ′j then
23 Stop contacting other nodes;
24 Send the request for data k directly to the relayer;
Our algorithm is online such that each node performs data
retrieval independently. Each request is sent to a content
provider u.a.r. once it is generated (line 7 in Algorithm 3).
Each node i can change its content provider for each request
in a repeated fashion if the bounded jump rule is satisfied.
Our algorithm is light-weight such that each node i needs
to contact only one content provider in Pk (d ′) for each re-
questqik with latency constraintd
′ at one time, where Pk (d ′) =
{i ∈ Pk : li < d ′ui }. The current latency constraint (i.e.,
d ′ = d − t + tk ) of the request is calculated at the requesting
node, where t and tk are the current time and the time when
the request is generated, respectively. It is worth noting that
every node in Pk has the same probability being selected,
although some nodes have failed to satisfy the bounded jump
rule in previous rounds.
The key idea of the bounded jump rule is to restrict the
change of content providers such that the potential of the
system decreases monotonically. Since all requests are pro-
cessed in a FIFO fashion, the nodes that have the requests
which can be processed within their latency constraints will
not consider changing their current strategies (see lines 9
and 22 in Algorithm 3). From the perspective of congestion
games, those requesting nodes have no incentives to change
their strategies since their costs cannot be reduced (for pure
Nash equilibrium) or not significantly reduced (for ϵ-Nash
equilibrium). More formally, for a given request qik (sent by
node i for data k) at node pki with a weightwk and a height
hik (t), by Eq. 38, the cost of qik at time t is
cqik
(a(t)) = min{max{hik (t) − (d − t + tk )upki , 0},wk }, (42)
where a(t) is the strategy profile of all nodes at t , and (d −
t + tk ) is the latency constraint of data k at t . This implies
cqik
(a(t)) = wk ⇐⇒ hik (t) − (d − t + tk )upki ≥ wk . (43)
Therefore, a node will consider to change its strategy for
its requests only when the costs of requests are higher than
their weights, otherwise it will stop contacting other nodes
(line 23 in Algorithm 3). If the requester of qik (i.e., node i)
finds another content provider j ′ at t (line 12 in Algorithm 3)
during the repeated update process (the loop from line 11
to line 23 in Algorithm 3) such that lj′(t) ≤ (d − t + tk )uj′ , it
will send qik to node j
′. It is worth noting that multiple nodes
may find the content provider j ′ and send requests to it at
the same time. In the worst case, only the first request can
be processed by node j ′ since nodes process requests in a
FIFO manner. Finally, the request will be sent to the relayers
if cqik (a(t)) = wk for any t ∈ [tk , tk + d]. It should be noted
that no requesting node will change its content provider mid-
way during a download, since it will stop contacting other
content providers if it can download the request data from
the current content provider (lines 9 and 22 in Algorithm 3).
With the bounded jump rule, it is easy to observe that the
potential function of game G is monotonically decreasing
such that for a given set of requests and ∀t1, t2, we have
t1 ≤ t2 =⇒ Φ(a(t1)) ≥ Φ(a(t2)). (44)
Furthermore, our algorithm applies to a fully distributed
and concurrent setting such that all nodes can change their
content providers at the same time without a centralized
coordination.
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7.3 Analysis
With the proposed bounded jump rule, a steady state is a
ϵ-Nash equilibrium of the congestion game. Therefore, a
critical question to investigate is how fast does the system
reach a ϵ-Nash equilibrium from any state? In what follows,
we seek to investigate the upper bound of the convergence
time of our data retrieval strategy.
Recall that the potential function of the game G with the
bounded jump rule is monotonically decreasing in the pres-
ence of concurrent changes of nodes’ strategies (nodes up-
date their content providers individually), because nodes
only consider to change the overloaded content providers.
More specifically, node i will change the content provider of
request qik , if and only if h
i, j
k − (d − t + tk )uj ≥ wk (i.e., Eq. 43
and Line 11 in Algorithm 3), where t and tk are the local time
and the time when the request is generated, respectively. The
equivalent condition is hi, jk + (t − tk )uj −wk ≥ d · uj . There-
fore, we can analyze the convergence rate of the proposed
node selection strategy via analyzing the convergence rate
of the corresponding congestion game.
Theorem 7.1. Given a game G = (Q, P , (Ai )i ∈Q , (fe )e ∈P )
that satisfies the bounded jump rule, where Q = ∪k ∈WQk
and P = ∪k ∈W Pk is the set of requests and content providers,
respectively. Then a ϵ-Nash equilibrium can be reached within
O(logn) rounds, where n = |V | is the number of online nodes.
Proof. Let Φ(t) be the potential of the game at time t . Ac-
cording to Eq. 41, we have Φ(t) = ∑k ∈Q (t )wk . Similarly, let
P(t) = ∪k ∈Q (t )Pk (d) be the set of underloaded nodes at time
t , where Pk (d) = {i ∈ Sk : li < d ·ui } denotes the set of under-
loaded nodes that have data k in their caches. Let n = |V | and
mt = |P(t)| be the number of online nodes and underloaded
content providers at time t , respectively. Note that a pure
equilibrium is reached at time t if (1) Φ(t) = 0 (all requests
can be delivered by nodes within latency constraints), or (2)
mt = 0 (no more underloaded content providers). Therefore,
we introduce a non-increasing function Ω(t) = mtΦ(t) to
analyze the convergence rate of DRS.
At time t + 1, let x = {x1,x2, ...,xmt } be a vector, where
xi denote the total size of requests that migrate to content
provider i ∈ P(t). Obviously, Φ(t) = ∑mti=1 xi . By applying
Cauchy-Schwarz inequality to E[Ω(t + 1)], which is the ex-
pected value of Ω(t + 1), we have the following:
E[Ω(t + 1)] = E[mt+1Φ(t + 1)]
≤ (E[m2t+1]E[Φ2(t + 1)]) 12 . (45)
Noting that the square root function f : x → √x and the
function д : x → x2 are convex functions, we apply Jensen’s
inequality to Eq. 45 and have the following:
E[Ω(t + 1)] ≤ E[mt+1]E[Φ(t + 1)]
=
mt∑
m=1
m Pr(mt+1 =m)E[Φ(t + 1)|mt+1 =m], (46)
wherem is the number of underloaded content providers in
P(t + 1) at time t + 1. The expected value of the potential
function givenm is
E[Φ(t + 1)|mt+1 =m] = Φ(t) −
(
m − 1
mt − 1
)
(
m
mt
) mt∑
i=1
xi
=
(
1 − m
mt
)
Φ(t). (47)
Combining Eq. 47 and Eq. 46, we have the following:
E[Ω(t + 1)] ≤
mt∑
m=1
m
(
1 − m
mt
)
Φ(t) Pr(mt+1 =m) (48)
≤ mt4 Φ(t)
mt∑
m=1
Pr(mt+1 =m) ≤ 14Ω(t). (49)
Let τ be the number of rounds that a ϵ-Nash equilibrium
(i.e., Ω(t + τ ) = O(1)) is reached from time t . By Lemma 7.2,
we have the following
E[τ |Ω(t)] ≤ log
(
Ω(t)
Ω(t + τ )
)
= log (Ψ(t)) . (50)
Note that the maximum value of of Ω(t) is |W |n2 (|W | is
the total number of data), which occurs in the case when
every node requests all the data in the region. Therefore,
E[τ ] ≤ 2 log(|W |n). By Markov’s inequality, we have that
Pr(τ ≥ 40 log(|W |n)) ≤ E[τ ]40 log(|W |n) = 0.05. (51)
This implies that Pr(τ ≤ 40 log(|W |n)) ≥ 0.95. As a result,
with a high probability, a ϵ-Nash equilibrium can be reached
from any state within O(logn) rounds. □
Lemma 7.2. LetX1,X2, ... denote a sequence of non-negative
random variables and assume that for all i ≥ 0
E[Xi |Xi−1 = xi−1] ≤ α · xi−1 (52)
for some constant α ∈ (0, 1). Furthermore, fix some constant
x∗ ∈ (0,x0] and let τ be the random variable that describes the
smallest t such that Xt ≤ x∗. Then,
E[τ |X0 = x0] ≤ 2log(1/α) · log
(x0
x∗
)
. (53)
Proof. The complete proof is shown in [17]. □
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Theorem 7.1 indicates that the proposed DRS can rapidly
reach a ϵ-Nash equilibrium within O(logn) communication
rounds from any state, where n = |V | is the total number of
online nodes in the system.
8 FUTUREWORK
At the time of writing, Fission is still a Proof of Concept, and
it has limitations that we want to address in future work. As
described in Section 7, nodes are contributing their resources
(e.g., storage and bandwidth) to speed up information propa-
gation and improve data availability. We leave to future work
the exploration of incentive mechanisms that encourages
nodes to share their resources, similar to Filecoin9. We also
leave to future work the use of advanced cryptography, such
as BLS signature scheme [5] for performance improvements
on PPAP consensus. Last but not least, we see in Section 5.4
that the system activity (i.e., online users participating the
consensus process) has a great impact to security guarantees.
Considering that most of users may not be online 24x7, we
will investigate some delegation mechanisms that improve
the security of our consensus protocol without significantly
degrading the decentralization nature of Fission .
9 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present Fission that distinguishes itself from
all existing permissionless blockchains that it achieves scala-
bility in both terms of system throughput and transaction
confirmation time through maximizing the parallelization
(Eager-Lazy pipeling) and efficiency (adaptive partitioning
and PoS-based consensus protocol) in the computation layer,
and minimizing the information propagation latency via a
hybrid topology.
REFERENCES
[1] L. Anderson, R. Holz, A. Ponomarev, P. Rimba, and I. Weber. New
kids on the block: an analysis of modern blockchains. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1606.06530, 2016.
[2] J. Benet. Ipfs-content addressed, versioned, p2p file system. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1407.3561, 2014.
[3] I. Bentov, R. Pass, and E. Shi. Snow white: Provably secure proofs of
stake. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2016:919, 2016.
[4] P. Berenbrink, T. Friedetzky, L. A. Goldberg, P. Goldberg, Z. Hu, and
R. Martin. Distributed selfish load balancing. In Proceedings of the Sev-
enteenth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithm, SODA
’06, pages 354–363, Philadelphia, PA, USA, 2006. Society for Industrial
and Applied Mathematics.
[5] D. Boneh, B. Lynn, and H. Shacham. Short signatures from the weil
pairing. In International Conference on the Theory and Application of
Cryptology and Information Security, pages 514–532. Springer, 2001.
[6] N. Buchbinder, J. S. Naor, et al. The design of competitive online
algorithms via a primal–dual approach. Foundations and Trends® in
Theoretical Computer Science, 3(2–3):93–263, 2009.
9https://filecoin.io/
[7] V. Buterin and V. Griffith. Casper the friendly finality gadget. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1710.09437, 2017.
[8] M. Castro and B. Liskov. Practical byzantine fault tolerance and
proactive recovery. ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS),
20(4):398–461, 2002.
[9] R. Cohen and S. Havlin. Scale-free networks are ultrasmall. Physical
review letters, 90(5):058701, 2003.
[10] B. David, P. Gaži, A. Kiayias, and A. Russell. Ouroboros praos: An
adaptively-secure, semi-synchronous proof-of-stake blockchain. In
Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of
Cryptographic Techniques, pages 66–98. Springer, 2018.
[11] J. R. Douceur. The sybil attack. In International workshop on peer-to-
peer systems, pages 251–260. Springer, 2002.
[12] Y. Emek, M. M. Halldórsson, Y. Mansour, B. Patt-Shamir, J. Radhakr-
ishnan, and D. Rawitz. Online set packing and competitive scheduling
of multi-part tasks. In Proceedings of the 29th ACM SIGACT-SIGOPS
symposium on Principles of distributed computing, pages 440–449, 2010.
[13] E. Even-Dar and Y. Mansour. Fast convergence of selfish rerouting.
In Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Dis-
crete algorithms, pages 772–781. Society for Industrial and Applied
Mathematics, 2005.
[14] I. Eyal, A. E. Gencer, E. G. Sirer, and R. Van Renesse. Bitcoin-ng: A
scalable blockchain protocol. In NSDI, pages 45–59, 2016.
[15] I. Eyal and E. G. Sirer. Majority is not enough: Bitcoin mining is
vulnerable. Communications of the ACM, 61(7):95–102, 2018.
[16] A. Fabrikant, C. Papadimitriou, and K. Talwar. The complexity of
pure nash equilibria. In Proceedings of the thirty-sixth annual ACM
symposium on Theory of computing, pages 604–612. ACM, 2004.
[17] S. Fischer, L. Olbrich, and B. Vöcking. Approximating wardrop equi-
libria with finitely many agents. Distributed Computing, 21(2):129–139,
2008.
[18] E. Foundation. Create a democracy contract inethereum. 2016.
https://www.ethereum.org/dao.
[19] N. Fountoulakis, K. Panagiotou, and T. Sauerwald. Ultra-fast rumor
spreading in social networks. In Proceedings of the twenty-third annual
ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms, pages 1642–1660, 2012.
[20] M. R. Garey and D. S. Johnson. Computers and intractability: A guide
to the theory of npcompleteness (series of books in the mathematical
sciences), ed. Computers and Intractability, 340, 1979.
[21] J. E. Gentle. Random number generation and Monte Carlo methods.
Springer Science & Business Media, 2006.
[22] Y. Gilad, R. Hemo, S. Micali, G. Vlachos, and N. Zeldovich. Algorand:
Scaling byzantine agreements for cryptocurrencies. In Proceedings of
the 26th Symposium on Operating Systems Principles, SOSP ’17, pages
51–68. ACM, 2017.
[23] D. Johnson, A. Menezes, and S. Vanstone. The elliptic curve digital sig-
nature algorithm (ecdsa). International journal of information security,
1(1):36–63, 2001.
[24] U. Klarman, S. Basu, A. Kuzmanovic, and E. G. Sirer. bloxroute: A
scalable trustless blockchain distribution network. 2018.
[25] E. Kokoris-Kogias, P. Jovanovic, L. Gasser, N. Gailly, E. Syta, and B. Ford.
Omniledger: A secure, scale-out, decentralized ledger via sharding.
In 2018 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP), pages 583–598.
IEEE, 2018.
[26] C. Li, P. Li, W. Xu, F. Long, and A. C.-c. Yao. Scaling nakamoto
consensus to thousands of transactions per second. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1805.03870, 2018.
[27] A. W. Marshall, I. Olkin, and B. C. Arnold. Inequalities: theory of
majorization and its applications, volume 143. Springer, 1979.
[28] P. Maymounkov and D. Mazieres. Kademlia: A peer-to-peer informa-
tion system based on the xor metric. In International Workshop on
Peer-to-Peer Systems, pages 53–65. Springer, 2002.
16
[29] S. Micali, M. Rabin, and S. Vadhan. Verifiable random functions. In
Foundations of Computer Science, 1999. 40th Annual Symposium on,
pages 120–130. IEEE, 1999.
[30] S. Nakamoto. Bitcoin: A peer-to-peer electronic cash system. 2008.
[31] N. Nisan, T. Roughgarden, E. Tardos, and V. V. Vazirani. Algorithmic
game theory. Cambridge University Press, 2007.
[32] A. Panconesi and M. Sozio. Fast distributed scheduling via primal-dual.
In Proceedings of the twentieth annual symposium on Parallelism in
algorithms and architectures, pages 229–235. ACM, 2008.
[33] J. Puchinger, G. R. Raidl, and U. Pferschy. The multidimensional knap-
sack problem: Structure and algorithms. INFORMS Journal on Com-
puting, 22(2):250–265, 2010.
[34] A. Schrijver. Theory of linear and integer programming. John Wiley &
Sons, 1998.
[35] A. Schrijver. Combinatorial optimization: polyhedra and efficiency,
volume 24. Springer Science & Business Media, 2003.
[36] S. SEC. Sec 2: Recommended elliptic curve domain parameters. Stan-
dards for Efficient Cryptography Group, Certicom Corp, 2000.
[37] Y. Sompolinsky, Y. Lewenberg, and A. Zohar. Spectre: A fast and
scalable cryptocurrency protocol. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive,
2016.
[38] Y. Sompolinsky and A. Zohar. Phantom: A scalable blockdag protocol,
2018.
[39] H.-W. Wang. Ethereum sharding: Overview and finality. 2017.
https://medium.com/@icebearhww/ethereum-sharding-and-finality-
65248951f649.
[40] G. Wood. Ethereum: A secure decentralised generalised transaction
ledger. Ethereum project yellow paper, 151:1–32, 2014.
[41] M. Zamani, M. Movahedi, and M. Raykova. Rapidchain: Scaling
blockchain via full sharding. In Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC
Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pages 931–948.
ACM, 2018.
A LEMMAS FOR PROOF OF THEOREM 6.4
Let J := {j | r j < ri } be the set of relay nodes that have a
smaller load ratio thanmi . Similarly let H := {h | rh > ri }
be the set of relay nodes that have a larger load ratio than
mi . Letm := |M | be the total number of relay nodes.
Lemma A.1. Let rt be the load ratio vector at time t . Then,
the expected load ratio of any relay node mi at time t +
1, denoted by rit+1, is the optimal load vector r , i.e., ∀ri ∈
r, E
[
rit+1 | rt
]
= r .
Proof. For any relay nodemk ∈ M , the nodes that choose
mk as a helper at time t will choose mi as the relay node
with probability Pr(k, j) (see Eq. 18), hence we have
E[rit+1 | rt ] =
1
ui
(
m∑
k=1
lk Pr(k, i)
)
=
1
ui
(∑
h∈H
lh Pr(h, i) + li −
∑
j ∈J
li Pr(i, j)
)
=
1
ui
©­«uiu
∑
k ∈H∪J
lk + li − li
u
∑
k ∈H∪J
uk
ª®¬
=
1
ui
©­«uiu l − uiu
∑
k<H∪J
lk +
li
u
∑
k<H∪J
uk
ª®¬ . (54)
For each node k < H ∪ J , rk = ri . Hence uiu
∑
k<H∪J lk −
li
u
∑
k<H∪J uk = 0. As a result, E
[
rit+1 | rt
]
= lu = r . □
Lemma A.2.
∑m
i=1 Var
[
rit+1 | rt
] ≤ (mΦ(rt )) 12 .
Proof. Let (Yi,1, . . . ,Yi,m) be a random variable drawn
from amultinomial distributionwith the constraint
∑m
j=1 Yi, j =
li . For each relay nodemi , the variance of the load ratio of
mi at time t + 1 is shown as below:
Var[rit+1 | rt ] =
m∑
k=1
Var( 1
ui
Yk,i ) = 1
u2i
m∑
k=1
Var(Yk,i )
=
1
u2i
(
m∑
k=1
lk Pr(k, i)(1 − Pr(k, i))
)
≤ 1
u2i
(∑
h∈H
lh Pr(h, i) + li (1 − Pr(i, i))
)
=
1
u2i
(∑
h∈H
lh
ui
u
(1 − ri
rh
) +
∑
j ∈J
li
uj
u
(1 − r j
ri
)
)
=
1
uiu
(∑
h∈H
(lh − riuh) +
∑
j ∈J
(
riuj − lj
))
=
1
uiu
m∑
k=1
|lk − riuk | = 1
u
m∑
k=1
uk
ui
|rk − ri |,
where ui is the upload capacity of relay node mi , and we
assume ui ≥ 2. Therefore, we sum up the variance of the
load ratio at each relay node and we have
m∑
i=1
Var[rit+1 | rt ] ≤
1
u
m∑
i=1
m∑
k=1
uk
ui
|rk − ri |. (55)
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For all rk , ri ∈ r, |rk − ri | ≤ |rk − r | + |ri − r |. Using this,
we can simplify the above inequality:
m∑
i=1
Var[rit+1 | rt ] ≤
1
u
m∑
i=1
m∑
k=1
uk
ui
(|rk − r | + |ri − r |)
=
m∑
i=1
1
ui
|ri − r | + 1
u
m∑
k=1
m∑
i=1
uk
ui
|rk − r |.
Note that themultivariable function f (u1, ...,um) = ∑mi=1 1ui
is a Schur-concave[27] function, and the maximum of f , de-
noted by sup f , is achieved if and only if ∀i, j ∈ [1,m], ui =
uj (by Karamata’s inequality[27]). That is sup f = f ( um , ..., um ).
Hence we have
1
u
m∑
k=1
m∑
i=1
uk
ui
|rk − r | ≤ m
u2
m∑
k=1
uk |rk − r |. (56)
Since ui ≥ 2 for eachmi ∈ M , we have ∑mi=1 1ui |ri − r | ≤
1
2 |ri − r |. In addition, 2muk ≤ u2 for any uk ≥ 2 andm ≥ 2.
Combining all the inequations above, we have
m∑
i=1
Var[rit+1 | rt ] ≤
m∑
i=1
|ri − r | (57)
Then, by Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we obtain
m∑
i=1
Var[rit+1 | rt ] ≤
(
m
m∑
i=1
|r − ri |2
) 1
2
≤ (mΦ(rt )) 12 (58)
□
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